Highlights of Past Issues
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Summer 2009, Volume 9, Number 1
The Man
Nobody Knew by
C. Evan Stewart (article in PDF; article in HTML)
Myron Taylor, industrialist
turned diplomat, helped defuse
America’s twentieth-century
crises from the Depression to
the Cold War—purposely out
of the spotlight.
The Defeat of
the Iroquois at
Lake Champlain by
David Hackett Fischer
On July 29, 1609, Samuel
de Champlain and his Indian
allies faced down a group of
Mohawk warriors––a battle
that would forever change
North American warfare.
Alert America by
Joshua Muse
Tractor-trailer convoys took
to America’s roads in the
1950s to educate citizens
about civil defense. But what
did the government seek to
accomplish by frightening
people?
Physician with a Vision by Donald L. Trump and
Edwin A. Mirand
In Buffalo, the renowned
Roswell Park Cancer Institute was founded in 1898 by
the physician whose name
is still synonymous with
cancer research, treatment,
and education.
“These Pimps of Piracy” by
Ron Soodalter
Of all the cities in America,
none was as invested in the
Atlantic slave trade as New
York. By 1860, a crisis was
assured.
“Sympathy for
Revolutionaries” by
Frank Donegan
In the age of the “Red Scare,” and before there were
card-carrying members, the
American Civil Liberties Union
was founded in New York to
uphold the Constitution for all.
Featured Article:
The Man Nobody Knew by C. Evan Stewart
In his day, Myron Charles
Taylor, born in 1874, was
America’s leading industrialist:
czar of the textile
industry, and later, in the
1920s and 30s, head of U.S.
Steel. But because of his
prominence, he also became
a key diplomatic participant in
some of the most important
geopolitical events of the
World War II era. Taylor is little
remembered today, however,
in large part because of his
intense personal distaste for
publicity; for much of his
business career, the national
media called him “the man
nobody knows.”
Although Taylor would later own a seventy-room mansion in New York City, a fabled villa in Tuscany, and a baronial country estate on Long Island, he was born and grew up in the small upstate town of Lyons (Wayne County), just south of Lake Ontario, where his father owned and operated a tannery business. Young Myron dreamed of becoming a lawyer; that dream took him to Ithaca and Cornell Law School, where he earned a Bachelor of Laws degree in 1894. He returned to Lyons and, for a time, struggled to establish a smalltown law practice.
Textile Czar
In the course of litigation he
handled for his father’s tannery,
Taylor bid for and won a
U.S. government contract to
manufacture mail pouches
and related products. As the
company expanded rapidly
beyond tannery products to
cotton, Taylor began to acquire
struggling mills, transforming
their labor practices and
modernizing their technology;
this modus operandi later
became known as the “Taylor
Formula.” Blessed with an
uncanny sense of timing, able
to apply the formula with great
discipline, and demonstrating
remarkable skills in corporate
finance, Taylor soon consolidated
and eventually dominated
the textile industry.
By the 1920s, Taylor was an extremely wealthy man. Having foreseen the boombust cycle in the commodities market, he had gotten out ofthe textile industry altogether, anticipating a blissful retirement and plenty of world travel with his wife, Anabel. But then his friend, J.P. Morgan, persuaded him to get involved with and ultimately take over the reins of the world’s largest industrial company, U.S. Steel. Taylor was reluctant, but agreed to do it.
After studying the company’s
struggling operations
for nearly two years, Taylor
identified the first priority:
reduce U.S. Steel’s existing
indebtedness, which totaled
a staggering $400 million.
Just before the stock market
crash in October 1929, he
retired $340 million in debt,
saving U.S. Steel approximately
$31 million in annual debtservicing
costs (and, as J.P.
Morgan noted, also saving the
company from being “busted
permanently”). During the
depths of the Depression,
when U.S. Steel was operating
at 17% capacity, Taylor refused
to fire employees. Instead,
he instituted a share-the-work
program whereby at least
75,000 workers kept their jobs (and thus their income).
During this difficult period,
Taylor also applied the “Taylor
Formula,” reorganizing
U.S. Steel’s operations and
upgrading its technology.
He also took another major step.In 1937, as “all America gasped,” Taylor struck a deal with John L. Lewis, then head of the Committee for Industrial Organization (CIO). U.S. Steel agreed to recognize a CIO subsidiary that would represent and organize the company’s workers, becoming the first major industrial company in America to reach an accord with organized labor. Although many captains of industry blasted Taylor as a traitor, in J.P. Morgan’s view “[Myron’s] was the finest performance I have ever known.”
“Ambassador Extraordinary”
Although Taylor literally
saved U.S. Steel during the
Depression and restored it to
robust health, he relinquished
the position of CEO in April
1938. Once again, he hoped
to enter a “sabbatical period
of life” with his wife Anabel—
but this time yet another friend,
President Franklin Delano
Roosevelt, called upon Taylor
to undertake critical diplomatic
duties as the president’s
“Ambassador Extraordinary
and Plenipotentiary.” Taylor’s
first assignment from FDR
was to help solve the deepening
crisis of Jewish refugees
who were attempting to flee
persecution in Hitler’s Germany.
Taylor’s efforts actually led
to a deal with Hitler and
Goering: the Nazis agreed to
permit 150,000 “able-bodied”
Jews to emigrate, with their
dependents allowed to follow
later. Undersecretary of
State Sumner Welles told the
president it was “better than
we hoped for.” Unfortunately,
because of the Nazi takeover
of Czechoslovakia and Poland
and the onset of World War II,
those efforts achieved no
tangible results.
On Christmas Eve, 1939, FDR asked Taylor to be his personal representative to Pope Pius XII. This very controversial move, which in many ways represented the crafty and purposeful FDR at his best, led to what was termed the “Taylor Mission” and Taylor’s critical involvement in such matters as ensuring that Lend-Lease aid (approximately $8 billion in 1941 dollars) got to the Soviet Union, which at that point was about to be overrun by the German Army. Taylor also brought the first documented proof of the Holocaust to the Pope and his senior advisors, convinced Generalissimo Franco of Spain not to join the war on the side of the Axis powers, and lobbied Prime Minister Salazar of Portugal to permit an Allied airbase in that neutral country. Taylor also helped broker Italy’s surrender and Mussolini’s departure, ensured that the Catholic Church did not break from the Allies’ policy of unconditional surrender, and almost single-handedly provided the mechanism and means for Italy’s post-war recovery.
During the war, when Taylor was based in Washington and unable to travel to Rome, FDR asked him to undertake a number of planning efforts. For‘example, Taylor chaired the economic committee whose work resulted in the Bretton Woods Agreement, and he was crucial to the planning and ultimate success of the United Nations. To avoidWoodrow Wilson’s fatal mistake of political isolationism with the League of Nations after World War I, one of Taylor’s principal assignments from FDR was to round up key Republicans to support the UN. Taylor also served on the State Department’s Subcommittee on Territorial Problems under the leadership of Dr. Isaiah Bowman, then president of Johns Hopkins University. The group focused on the massive refugee population (approximately twenty million) that was being created as a result of the war’s devastation.
A Fateful Prophecy
A priority for the Bowman
group was to figure out what
to do regarding the issue of
Palestine. With the formation
of the League of Arab States,
encouraged by Britain, as
background, on March 14,
1944 Taylor wrote to Secretary
of State Cordell Hull about
his concern over efforts “to
encourage a consolidation
of the Arab world,” stating
that such a plan “is filled
with dangers of many sorts.”
Among Taylor’s worries was
the fact that “we in this country
know all too little about
[the Arab world].” He added,
with amazing prescience,“Perhaps one thing the world
has to fear in the future is that
strong aggregation of people
bound by ties of blood and
religion, especially those who
are almost fanatical, now separated
into groups and tribes
and states, may join themselves
together to oppose…
the relatively smaller numbers
of the Anglo-Saxon world.”
When I found and read this memorandum in a collection of Taylor’s papers at the Library of Congress, I wondered what Secretary Hull’s response had been to Taylor’s prediction of future conflict with the Arab world. On my next trip to consult the main body of Taylor’s papers in the Olin Library at Cornell University, I found Hull’s response in a memorandum dated April 1, 1944. Hull was clearly influenced in his thinking by British Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden, citing at length a 1941 speech by Eden: “It seems to me both natural and right that cultural and economic ties between the Arab countries, yes, and the political ties too, should be strengthened. His Majesty’s government for their part will give their full support to any scheme that commands general approval.” Hull then went on to poohpooh Taylor’s concerns, opining that “the difficulties existing to Arab unity are far from negligible, and the initial steps in that direction would in all probability be only cultural and economic lines.”
Unfortunately, Hull (and Eden) were proven to be wrong. 1945 saw the implementation of the Arab League Pact, which later that year boycotted Jewish businesses in Palestine to oppose the formation of Israel. And in 1947, the British withdrew support for its Mandate of Palestine, stating that it was unable to find a solution acceptable to both the Jews and the Arabs. Later that same year, the UN approvedthe partition of Palestine into two states—one Jewish, one Arab—with Israel declaring independence in 1948. Most historians agree that the contemporary roots of the Arab-Israeli conflict, and probably Muslim extremism, stem from this post-World War II period. Taylor continued to press President Truman with his geopolitical concerns on this front, but his and others’ views, notably those of Secretary of State George Marshall and Undersecretary of State Robert Lovett, were overruled after a bitter intra-administration debate initiated by Truman and buttressed by his principal domestic advisor, Clark Clifford.
“A Useful Life”
After World War II, President
Truman asked Taylor to continue
on in his ambassadorial capacity
to the Vatican, but with the
advent of the Cold War the
Taylor Mission morphed into a
different model, more oriented
to visiting church officials (and
others) throughout Europe,
particularly in Russian-dominated
areas of central and eastern
Europe. Taylor’s new mission
was primarily designed to
gather Cold War informationto which no other Westerner
had access, and to shore up
opposition by the Catholic
Church to the Soviet Union in
fragile post-war Europe. By all
measures, he succeeded on
both scores.
In 1948, the pope named Taylor a Knight of the Order of Pius IX, First Degree, and on December 20 President Truman awarded Taylor the Presidential Medal for Merit. Truman praised Taylor for having “earned the accolades of his countrymen whom he has served faithfully and well wherever duty called him.” Shortly thereafter, Taylor informed both the pope and the president that he would finally be retiring—a decision made public in January 1950.
Myron Taylor quietly lived out the remainder of his life. He did not publish his memoirs or seek public accolades. His beloved Anabel died on December 12, 1958, and Taylor died five months later, on May 6, 1959. The New York Times, reviewing his “extraordinary abilities” and his multifaceted career, employed considerable understatement when it concluded that “[h]is was, indeed, a useful life.”

